000			03976cam a2200685Mi 4500
001			on1280942626
003			OCoLC
005			20220517104743.0
006			m d
007			cr |||||||||||
008			211027t20212021gw fod z000 0 eng d
040			_aDEGRU _beng _erda _cDEGRU _dN$T
019			_a1283924995
020			_a3110736195
020			_a9783110736199 _q(electronic bk.)
024	7		_a10.1515/9783110736199 _2doi
035			_a3063107 _b(N$T)
035			_a(OCoLC)1280942626 _z(OCoLC)1283924995
044			_agw _cDE
050		4	_aBD232
072		7	_aPHI005000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a100
049			_aMAIN
100	1		_aRiedener, Stefan, _eauthor. _4aut _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut _947880
245	1	0	_aUncertain Values : _bAn Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty / _cStefan Riedener.
264		1	_aBerlin ; _aBoston : _bDe Gruyter, _c[2021]
264		4	_c©2021
300			_a1 online resource (XII, 156 pages).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	0		_aIdeen & Argumente , _x1862-1147
505	0	0	_tFrontmatter -- _tAcknowledgments -- _tContents -- _t1 The problem of axiological uncertainty -- _t2 The basic argument -- _t3 Evaluating the argument -- _t4 The problem of intertheoretic comparisons -- _t5 The problem of probabilities -- _t6 The problem of incommensurabilities -- _tA Appendix -- _tBibliography -- _tIndex Rerum -- _tIndex Nominum
520			_aHow ought you to evaluate your options if you're uncertain about what's fundamentally valuable? A prominent response is Expected Value Maximisation (EVM)--the view that under axiological uncertainty, an option is better than another if and only if it has the greater expected value across axiologies. But the expected value of an option depends on quantitative probability and value facts, and in particular on value comparisons across axiologies. We need to explain what it is for such facts to hold. Also, EVM is by no means self-evident. We need an argument to defend that it's true. This book introduces an axiomatic approach to answer these worries. It provides an explication of what EVM means by use of representation theorems: intertheoretic comparisons can be understood in terms of facts about which options are better than which, and mutatis mutandis for intratheoretic comparisons and axiological probabilities. And it provides a systematic argument to the effect that EVM is true: the theory can be vindicated through simple axioms. The result is a formally cogent and philosophically compelling extension of standard decision theory, and original take on the problem of axiological or normative uncertainty.
536			_afunded by Schweizerischer Nationalfonds (SNF)
546			_aIn English.
588	0		_aDescription based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 27. Okt 2021).
590			_aAdded to collection customer.56279.3
650		4	_aErwartungswert. _947881
650		4	_aRepräsentationstheoreme. _947882
650		4	_aintertheoretische Vergleiche. _947883
650		4	_anormative Unsicherheit. _947884
650		0	_aValues _xDecision making. _947885
650		0	_aUncertainty. _910737
653			_aNormative uncertainty.
653			_aexpected value.
653			_aintertheoretic comparisons.
653			_arepresentation theorems.
655		4	_aElectronic books.
710	2		_aSchweizerischer Nationalfonds (SNF) _efunder. _4fnd _4http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/fnd
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9783110736229
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9783110739572
856	4	0	_3EBSCOhost _uhttps://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=3063107
938			_aDe Gruyter _bDEGR _n9783110736199
938			_aEBSCOhost _bEBSC _n3063107
942			_cEBK
994			_a92 _bN$T
999			_c7905 _d7905