Preface; Contents; Introduction; 1 What is conceptual analysis and what is the problem?; 1.1 What is conceptual analysis?; 1.2 From Frege to Kripke and Putnam; 2 Two-dimensionalism and the necessary a posteriori; 2.1 Two-dimensionalism; 2.1.1 Primary and secondary intensions; 2.1.2 Metaphysical plenitude and two-fold world dependence; 2.1.3 Scrutability and canonical descriptions; 2.1.4 Two-dimensionalism and Jackson's descriptivism; 2.1.5 Two notions of apriority; 2.2 Modal illusions according to Kripke and according to twodimensionalism; 2.2.1 Kripke's two models of modal error.

2.2.2 Doubts about the accounts of modal error2.2.2.1 Doubts about the epistemic counterpart model; 2.2.2.2 Doubts about the reference fixer model; 2.3 Summary and outlook: What has been shown and what is yet to be shown; 3 The challenge from the epistemic arguments; 3.1 Primary intensions and the epistemic arguments; 3.1.1 The primary intensions of natural kind terms; 3.1.1.1 Vagueness; 3.1.1.2 Intersubjective variation and the individuation of concepts .; 3.1.2 Semantic deference and the primary intensions of names; 3.1.2.1 The argument from Ignorance and Error.

3.1.2.2 Deferential concepts and the alleged problem of circularity3.1.2.3 Deferential concepts and apriority; 3.1.2.4 Two methods for detecting deferential concepts and two problems for two-dimensionalism; 3.2 Linguistic meaning, mental content, and two-dimensionalism; 4 Primary intensions, defining the subject, and communication; 4.1 Defining the subject; 4.1.1 A case for the epistemic thesis; 4.1.1.1 From (CJ) to (CJ+) -- Schroeter's improv model; 4.1.1.2 From (CJ+) to (CJ++); 4.1.2 The failure of the semantic thesis; 4.2 Two-dimensional communication; 4.2.1 The semantic thesis.

4.2.1.1 Communication involving indexical expressions4.2.1.2 Communication involving proper names; 4.2.1.3 Communication involving natural kind terms; 4.2.2 The epistemic thesis; 4.2.2.1 The importance of shared primary intensions; 4.2.2.2 How primary intensions help to promote co-reference even when they are not shared; 4.2.2.2.1 Proper names; 4.2.2.2.2 Natural kind terms; 5 Epistemic transparency and epistemic opacity; 5.1 Arguments for ubiquitous opacity; 5.1.1 Millikan; 5.1.2 Putnam; 5.1.3 Kornblith; 5.2 Revealing opacity; 5.2.1 Revealing opacity via the function of a term.

5.2.2 Revealing opacity via considerations about hypothetical cases5.2.3 Can opacity be determined a priori?; 5.3 The value of opaque terms in conceptual analysis; 5.3.1 Discovering essences; 5.3.2 Variation in primary intensions; 6 Scrutability, primary intensions, and conceptual analysis; 6.1 Scrutability and primary intensions; 6.1.1 From descriptivism to the scrutability thesis; 6.1.2 A case for (CJ); 6.1.2.1 Argument from metaphysical plenitude; 6.1.2.2 Arguments from the scrutability of specific kinds of facts .; 6.1.2.3 Arguments from the absence of clear counterexamples.

6.1.2.4 Arguments from the epistemic indispensability of scrutability.

According to epistemic two-dimensionalism, or simply twodimensionalism, linguistic expressions are associated with two intensions, one of which represents an expression's a priori implications. The author investigates the prospects of conceptual analysis on the basis of a twodimensionalist theory of meaning. He discusses a number of arguments for and against two-dimensional semantics and argues that properly construed, two-dimensionalism provides a potent and plausible account of meaning. Against the background of this account, the author then goes on to assess the value of conceptual analysis.

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