part I Preliminaries -- chapter 1 Introduction / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 2 Preliminaries -- Consciousness / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 3 Preliminaries -- Value / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 4 Preliminaries -- Moral status / Joshua Shepherd -- part II An account of phenomenal value -- chapter 5 What it is like and beyond / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 6 Evaluative phenomenal properties / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 7 The importance of phenomenal character / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 8 Contra Moore on an important point / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 9 Hedonism about the value within consciousness / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 10 The bearers of phenomenal value / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 11 Thick experiences / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 12 Meta-evaluative properties / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 13 Evaluative spaces, part I / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 14 Evaluative spaces, part II / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 15 How far we have come / Joshua Shepherd -- part III Moral status and difficult cases -- chapter 16 Moral status -- Machines and post-persons / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 17 Moral status -- The other animals / Joshua Shepherd -- chapter 18 Moral status -- Human cases / Joshua Shepherd.

It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in Permanent Vegetative State (PVS); debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness; controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia; and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness.